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 A Reconsideration of the
Shareholder’s Remedy for
Oppression in Singapore
Pearlie M.C. Koh*
Abstract: The statutory remedy for oppression plays an important role
in minority shareholder protection in Singapore. Both the scope of its
application and the court’s jurisdiction to make remedial orders must
necessarily be wide in order for the remedy to be effective. Never-
theless, the remedy is not without limits. Indeed, it is crucial that the
boundaries of the remedy be made clear so that legitimate rule of
the majority is not too often, and erroneously, equated with tyranny
by the majority. This paper considers a number of issues as to the scope
of the oppression remedy in Singapore through a careful analysis of
Singaporean cases, and also references and contrasts the approaches
adopted in other common law jurisdictions.
Keywords: company law, minority shareholders, oppression remedy,
scope, Singapore
I. Introduction
On the shareholder litigation landscape in common law jurisdictions,
the shareholder’s statutory remedy for oppression and/or unfair
prejudice1 occupies a pre-eminent position. As companies operate on
the basis of the majority rule, the challenges that minority share-
holders may potentially encounter are not difficult to contemplate.
Controlling shareholders are not subject to any obligation2 to con-
sider the interests of the minority when exercising their votes. As
Dixon J observed in Peters’ American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath:3
The shareholders are not trustees for one another, and, unlike directors,
they occupy no fiduciary position and are under no fiduciary duties.
They vote in respect of their shares, which are property and the right to
* Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University; e-mail:
pearliekoh@smu.edu.sg.
1 The remedy is often referred to as a remedy for ‘oppression’, which term is used
as shorthand for the various situations of unfairness contemplated by the section,
including conduct that is in disregard of the member’s interests and/or
discriminatory or prejudicial conduct.
2 Beyond the equitable doctrine of fraud on a power, manifested in company law as
the doctrine of fraud on the minority: Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater
London Council [1982] 1 All ER 437 (Ch) at 445.
3 (1939) 61 CLR 457 (HCA).
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vote is attached to the share itself as an incident of property to be
enjoyed and exercised for the owner’s personal advantage.4
This gives rise to a potential conflict of interests between the majority
and minority shareholder factions, which, in the jargon of economists,
is a classic ‘agency problem’.5 A minority shareholder may therefore
find the company run by the majority in a manner that ignores his
concerns. In some cases, he may find that he has little choice but to
accept the lot of a minority shareholding. However, he might also find
himself in a more sinister situation, locked in an investment that has
turned out quite differently from what he had initially bargained for,
or perhaps far worse, being expropriated by the majority. It is one
thing if the unprofitability of the venture for the shareholder is a result
of the normal vicissitudes of commerce, but quite another if it was
brought about by the unfair acts of the majority. The problem is
exacerbated for the minority shareholder in small and privately-held
companies who, unlike his counterpart in a public company, does not
have the easy option of withdrawing his investment.6 The statutory
remedy for oppression was therefore introduced, first in England,7 to
4 Ibid. at 504. See also Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70 at 75–6; Tai Kim San v
Lim Cher Kia [2000] 3 SLR(R) 892 (HC) at [62].
5 See generally R. Kraakman et al. (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A
Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
New York, 2009) ch. 2. Economists view ‘agents’ as being parties whose actions
affect the welfare of others (referred to as principals). Agency problems arise
because the agent needs to be motivated to act in the interests of the principal,
and not act in an opportunistic manner to benefit himself. The conflict between
minority and majority shareholders exists because the majority (the agent) may
not always consider the interests of the minority (the principal) when exercising
its control vis-à-vis the company’s affairs. This gives rise to agency costs because
the principal has to engage in monitoring the agent’s performance, thereby
resulting in a reduction in value of that performance to the principal. As
economists consider an overall reduction of costs as efficient, the law is seen as a
social tool which should be evaluated and interpreted in a manner that promotes
this efficiency. It is acknowledged that there has been a significant movement in
legal research towards an interdisciplinary methodology that draws from the
perspectives of the social sciences such as economics. The approach adopted in
this paper, however, remains the traditional method of legal research which
involves close analysis of judicial decisions. This method is adopted mainly
because it accords with the legal analysis undertaken by the judiciary and legal
practitioners in Singapore, and as a result, provides, it is hoped, research that is
of applied utility and significance. However, where relevant, reference will be
made to efficiency-driven considerations that move law and economics scholars
as this can crystallize our understanding of the law’s underlying assumptions. As
we shall see, in the context of s. 216, both perspectives yield consistent
conclusions.
6 The other statutory exit available to the minority shareholder is the petition to
wind-up the company on the just and equitable ground under Companies Act,
s. 254(1)(i). See also B.R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation
(Oxford University Press: New York, 1997) 62–3; 470.
7 The oppression remedy was first introduced in the UK as s. 210 of the Companies
Act 1948 (UK). This section provided the inspiration for similar legislation in
Australia (now Corporations Act 2001 (Aust), s. 232); Canada (Canadian Business
Corporations Act 1985, s. 241); Malaysia (Companies Act 1965 (M’sia), s. 181) and
New Zealand (Companies Act 1993 (NZ), s. 174).
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‘strengthen the minority shareholders of a private company in resist-
ing oppression by the majority’.8 In Singapore, the remedy is found in
s. 2169 of the Companies Act Cap 50.10
Although it has been judicially observed that the law on what con-
stitutes oppression under s. 216 is ‘settled’,11 there remain a number of
matters with respect to the parameters of s. 216 that may benefit from
clarification. For example, whilst the vast majority of cases have af-
firmed the personal12 nature of the remedy, there appears to be in-
creasing recognition that the utility of the section may extend beyond
the personal remit to permit the vindication of what are essentially
corporate rights. It is, however, questionable whether this should be
accepted without qualification.
This paper considers this and other issues in connection with the
boundaries of s. 216 by analysing Singaporean cases, and also by
referencing and contrasting the approach adopted in other common
law jurisdictions, in particular England. The purpose here is to deter-
mine, by a consideration of the boundaries of s. 216, what the law
contained therein is and, arguably, should be. Whilst it is true that the
specific statutory text of the remedy has deviated across jurisdictions,
and at times significantly so, it is nevertheless also the case that the
underlying reasons and motivation for the inclusion of the remedy are
and remain the same. The utility of a comparative investigation should
therefore not be undermined. Indeed, as we shall see, important in-
sight can be gained by adopting this approach in analysing s. 216.
II. Laying the Groundwork – Must ‘Unfairness’ be
Commercial?
The court may make an order under s. 216 if and only if ‘the court is of
the opinion’ that the petitioner’s case falls within one of the two limbs
8 Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd 6659) of 1945 at
[60]. Economists will describe the remedy as a legal strategy employed to mitigate
the agency costs associated with the tensions between majority and minority
shareholders: see Kraakman, above n. 5, ch. 2.
9 Section 216 provides that:
[A] member . . . of a company . . . may apply to the Court for an order under
this section on the ground
(a) that the affairs of the company are being conducted or the powers of the
directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to one or more of the
members . . . including himself or in disregard of his or their interests as
members . . . of the company; or
(b) that some act of the company has been done or is threatened or that some
resolution of the members . . . or any class of them has been passed or is
proposed which unfairly discriminates against or is otherwise prejudicial to
one or more of the members . . . (including himself).
10 2006 rev edn (Singapore) (hereinafter ‘Companies Act’). The rationale for the
introduction of s. 216 was to provide a ‘remedy to minority interests who are
being oppressed by the majority’: Companies Bill 1966, Explanatory Statement.
11 Lim Swee Khiang v Borden Co (Pte) Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 745 (CA) at [80].
12 In the sense that the petitioner is seeking to remedy a wrong that he has suffered,
or at least perceived to have suffered.
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of s. 216(1). If the petitioning member is unable to establish this, the
court cannot exercise or assume any jurisdiction to grant relief pursu-
ant to s. 216(2).13 The two limbs of s. 216(1) stipulate what appear to be
four separate grounds of: oppression; disregard of interests; unfair
discrimination; and prejudicial conduct.14 This differs from the corres-
ponding provision in the English companies legislation, which pro-
vides in essence for the single ground of unfair prejudice.15 It has,
however, been made clear that, notwithstanding the apparently dis-
crete grounds, any attempt to distinguish between them would not be
meaningful.16 As one commentator put it, this would be akin to ‘split-
ting pedantic hairs’.17 Indeed, it can be readily appreciated that each
of the four grounds is really illustrative of the nature of the conduct on
the part of the majority or controllers of the company that can found a
petition under s. 216. It can therefore be reasonably surmised that, by
stipulating these grounds, legislature intended to underscore the
width of the section, rather than to dictate that the petitioner’s case
should fall squarely within one or other of them in order to succeed.18
As the local courts have repeatedly observed, there is a ‘common
thread’19 that runs through s. 216.
The courts have, at various times, referred to this common thread
as being the element of commercial unfairness.20 Whilst this might be
13 Hoban Steven Maurice Dixon v Scanlon Graeme John [2005] 2 SLR(R) 632 (HC) at
[12].
14 See Companies Act, s. 216(1)(a) and (b).
15 Companies Act 2006 (UK), s. 994(1), which is identical to its predecessor,
Companies Act 2006 (UK), s. 459, provides that a member of a company may
apply to court for an order on the ground that:
(a) the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which
is unfairly prejudicial to the interest of its members generally or some part of
the members (including himself) or (b) that any actual or proposed act or
omission of the company (including any act or omission on its behalf) is or
would be so prejudicial.
16 Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 111 (CA) at [68]. See
also M. Chew, Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies, 2nd edn (Lexis Nexis:
Singapore, 2007) [122].
17 Chew, ibid. at [120].
18 When the predecessor to Companies Act, s. 216 was introduced in 1966, the
Explanatory Statement to the Companies Bill 1966 stated that the provision was
drafted to ‘incorporate . . . the improvements recommended by the Jenkins
Committee’. In the Report of the Company Law Committee 1962, Cm 1749, the
Jenkins Committee had recommended that the original oppression remedy
stipulated in Companies Act 1948 (UK), s. 210 (which had been restrictively
interpreted) be amended to make it clear that the remedy was meant to cover not
merely acts which are ‘oppressive’ in the narrow sense, but also acts which are or
have the effect of being unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the complaining
members: at para. 204.
19 Teo Lay Swee v Teo Siew Eng [2001] SGHC 29 at [21]; Ng Sing King v PSA
International Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 56 (HC) at [93]; Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests
Holdings Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 111 (HC) at [68]; on appeal, Over & Over, above n.
16.
20 See Lim Swee Khiang, above n. 11 at [80]. See also Tong Keng Meng v Inno-Pacific
Holdings Ltd [2001] 3 SLR(R) 311 (HC); Ng Sing King, above n. 19 at [93]; Over &
Over, above n. 16 at [81].
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read as suggesting that only unfairness measured against some com-
mercial yardstick is relevant, it is submitted that this is unlikely to be
what the courts intend. Indeed, the many instances of oppression
found in family-run companies may not have resulted in remedy if any
sort of commercial measure was used. As Lord Hoffmann pointed out
in O’Neill v Phillips:21
Although fairness is a notion which can be applied to all kinds of activ-
ities, its content will depend upon the context in which it is being used.
Conduct which is perfectly fair between competing businessmen may
not be fair between members of a family.22
In Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd,23 Lord Wilberforce stated the
applicable test as ‘a visible departure from the standards of fair deal-
ing and a violation of the conditions of fair play which a shareholder
is entitled to expect’.24 Although not explicitly articulated then, it has
since been made clear that these standards and expectations are in-
formed by the particular relationship between the members of the
company. Thus, where the relationship is one that is personal and
premised on mutual trust and confidence, the court has greater lee-
way to take account of the shareholders’ expectations and may, on
that basis, conclude that it is unfair for the majority to insist on its
strict legal rights under the constitution,25 the lawfulness of the major-
ity’s acts notwithstanding.26
The case of Tang Choon Keng Realty (Pte) Ltd v Tang Wee Cheng27
illustrates the point. The petitioner, TWC, and his brothers, TWS and
TWK, were shareholders and directors in the family company, TCKR,
which was founded by their father. TCKR owned certain premises,
part of which was rented out to a department store and the remaining
part to a hotel. The department store was run by a publicly listed
company, CKT, which was managed by TWS and TWK, while the
hotel was run by a company, DH, controlled by TWC. A conflict arose
between TWC and his brothers in connection with the sale of the
premises. TCKR had earlier granted an option to CKT to buy the
department store premises from TCKR in exchange for newly issued
shares in CKT. Far from according similar favourable treatment to DH
as TWC had expected, TWS and TWK exercised their majority votes
in TCKR to resolve that TCKR would not sell the hotel premises to DH
at any price at all. In addition, TWC alleged that his brothers sought to
impede him from carrying on a viable hotel business as DH was
21 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) (O’Neill).
22 Ibid. at 1098.
23 [1978] 2 MLJ 227 (UKPC) (Re Kong Thai Sawmill).
24 Ibid. at 229 (emphasis added). See also Low Peng Boon v Low Janie [1999] 1
SLR(R) 337 (CA) at [43]; Over & Over, above n. 16 at [77].
25 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) at 379.
26 Over & Over, above n. 16 at [85]. See also Re Saul D Harrison and Sons plc [1995]
1 BCLC 14 (CA) at 19.
27 [1991] 2 SLR(R) 1 (HC). See also Jesner v Jarrad Properties Ltd [1993] BCLC 1032
(SC); and Brownlow v G H Marshall Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 655 (Ch).
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treated as an outside tenant and charged commercial rent rates. These
acts, asserted TWC, demonstrated a course of conduct that was op-
pressive towards him as a member of TCKR.
The court took account of the ‘larger context of the family relation-
ship’,28 and held that the allegations were capable of sustaining a
petition under s. 216. Chan Sek Keong J (as Chan CJ then was) ob-
served as follows:
These allegations, cumulatively with the other complaints, are capable of
being construed as a departure from the standards of fair dealing
amongst the brothers in relation to their relative expectations of their
entitlement to their inheritance of the family assets.29
Judged against a purely commercial yardstick, the conduct com-
plained of may not be considered unfair at all. After all, shareholders
with external interests cannot expect to be accorded preferential
treatment by the company, treatment which may even arguably be
considered to be at the company’s expense. However, when con-
sidered against the familial background in which the impugned acts
occurred, the unfairness may be readily appreciated.
Where, on the other hand, the relationship between the members is
purely commercial, or is one which lacks that personal factor, there
would be little room to consider, in assessing fairness, matters beyond
what is often exhaustively defined by the company’s constitution. This
was the position reached in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc.30 The
essence of the petitioner’s complaint was that whilst the company,
which was incidentally a family-run concern, had substantial net as-
sets, it had, in recent times, been run at a loss, and therefore ought to
have been liquidated to allow the assets to be distributed to the share-
holders. The petitioner, a family member, alleged that the directors
(who were her cousins) had unreasonably continued to run the busi-
ness, allowing those assets to be dissipated in losses in order to pre-
serve their own salaries and perquisites. The court, however, found
that there was no ground on which to extend the petitioner’s rights
beyond that which was laid down by the constitution. The petitioner
had been given her shares pursuant to a reorganization of the share
capital, the terms of which scheme were binding upon her. As there
was nothing to bring the company outside the realm of commercial
companies, Hoffmann LJ emphasized that fairness was to be assessed
in the context of commercial relationships. In the circumstances,
therefore, her only ‘protectable’ expectation amounted to ‘no more
than an expectation that the board would manage the company in
accordance with their fiduciary obligations and the terms of the
articles and the Companies Act’.31 Given that there was no evidence
28 [1992] 2 SLR 1114 (HC) at [26].
29 Ibid. at [27].
30 Above n. 26.
31 Ibid. at [20].
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that the directors had stepped beyond their remit, the petition was
accordingly dismissed.32
In the final analysis, therefore, the premise upon which s. 216 is
predicated is simply unfairness, albeit assessed contextually. The in-
quiry is a multi-faceted33 one, and ensures that the non-pecuniary
considerations, so often present in cases involving allegations of
shareholder oppression, are accorded due consideration. As Chan
Sek Keong CJ observed in Sim Yong Kim v Evenstar Investments Pte
Ltd,34 ‘unfairness can arise in different situations and from different
kinds of conduct in different circumstances’. The basis of s. 216 is thus
in common with that which sustains the equivalent English provi-
sion.35 It is perhaps this shared premise that prompted the Court of
Appeal to observe, notwithstanding the significant difference in
wording, that the English provision ‘corresponds materially’36 with
s. 216. This, however, leads us to the next matter, which has been
judicially asserted as being a point of difference between s. 216 and
the UK provision.
III. Prejudice as a Separate Concept from Unfairness
It has been held in connection with the English provision that the
relevant conduct must ‘be both prejudicial (in the sense of causing
prejudice or harm to the relevant interest) and also unfairly so: con-
duct may be unfair without being prejudicial or prejudicial without
being unfair, and it is not sufficient if the conduct satisfies only one of
these tests’.37 The position is the same under New Zealand’s oppres-
sion provision,38 which employs the phrase ‘oppressive, unfairly dis-
criminatory or unfairly prejudicial’. In the New Zealand Court of
Appeal decision of Thomas v HW Thomas Ltd,39 Richardson J, in
considering this phrase, made the following observation:
The three expressions overlap, each in a sense helps to explain the other,
and read together they reflect the underlying concern of the subsection
that conduct of the company which is unjustly detrimental to any mem-
ber of the company whatever form it takes and whether it adversely
affects all members alike or discriminates against some only is a legit-
imate foundation for a complaint under s 209. The statutory concern is
32 For an example of a case where there is commercial unfairness, see Over & Over,
above n. 16.
33 Ibid. at [81].
34 [2006] 3 SLR(R) 827 (CA) at [31].
35 Lord Hoffmann observed that the English parliament had chosen ‘fairness as the
criterion by which the court must decide whether it has jurisdiction to grant
relief’: O’Neill, above n. 21 at 1098.
36 In Lim Swee Khiang, above n. 11 at [82].
37 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons, above n. 26 at 31 (Neill LJ).
38 Companies Act 1955 (NZ), s. 209, presently Companies Act 1993 (NZ), s. 174(1).
39 [1984] 1 NZLR 686 (CA).
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directed to instances or courses of conduct amounting to an unjust
detriment to the interests of a member or members of the company.40
This ‘twin-prong’ requirement that the petitioner has to meet was
accepted as applicable to s. 216 by Rubin J in Ng Sing King v PSA
International Pte Ltd (No 2).41 However, in the later case of Over &
Over v Bonvests Holdings Ltd,42 Woo Bih Li J disagreed with Rubin J.
Woo J observed that the requirement of prejudice under the English
provision was derived from the specific wording of that provision.
Given that s. 216 is not couched in identical terms, his Honour was of
the view that whilst prejudice is an important factor in the overall
assessment of unfairness, it is not an essential requirement.43 Justice
Woo’s view on this particular point was subsequently affirmed by the
Court of Appeal.44
But is this the correct interpretation vis-à-vis s. 216? The inquiry
should perhaps begin with a consideration of what ‘prejudice’ means.
There has been no conclusive definition, although English courts ap-
pear to have adopted the ordinary meaning of the term and in a fairly
generous sense. Hence, there is prejudice if the impugned act or
conduct results in some adverse impact, actual or potential, on the
interests of the petitioning member. The circumstances in which
prejudice is manifested thus range from the obvious, involving actual
harm to the member’s interests, which would include the denial of
dividends45 and damage to the value of the member’s shareholding,46
to the less obvious instances of disappointed shareholder expecta-
tions.47 Situations of the latter type may not be immediately indicative
of any harm to the member’s interests as such, but are nevertheless
considered prejudicial. An illustration of this type of prejudice is pro-
vided by the Scottish decision of McGuinness v Bremner plc.48 There,
a delay of some several months by the board of directors of the
company in convening a general meeting requisitioned by the peti-
tioners was considered prejudicial conduct. Lord Davidson opined as
follows:
[T]he right of holders of the requisite amount of share capital to requisi-
tion an extraordinary general meeting is one of the most valuable
remedies which minority shareholders enjoy. They enjoy that right by
virtue of their holding shares of the required number. As a rule they are
entitled to expect that that remedy can be exercised by the holding of a
meeting within a reasonable period. If the period of notice is, as it is
40 Ibid. at 693 (emphasis added).
41 Above n. 19 at [96].
42 Above n. 19.
43 Ibid. at [76].
44 Over & Over, above n. 16 at [76].
45 See e.g. Re a Company, ex p Glossop [1988] 1 WLR 1068 (Ch); Re Sam Weller &
Sons Ltd [1990] Ch 682.
46 See Re RA Noble (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273 (Ch).
47 Re Phoenix Contracts (Leicester) Limited [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) at [107].
48 [1988] BCLC 673 (SC) (McGuinness).
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here, of the order of six months, I consider that the petitioners as share-
holders are prejudiced because any reasonable bystander would have
no difficulty in concluding that such a delay was prejudicial to their
interests . . ..49
Prejudice to the shareholder is also frequently found when there is a
breach of directors’ duties. The fact that the prejudice suffered by the
member is reflective of the prejudice suffered by the company does
not detract from the fact that the member’s interests have been ad-
versely affected. A breach of directors’ duty is likely to cause damage
to the company and hence jeopardy50 to the value of the member’s
shareholding, and this is clearly prejudice suffered by the member in
his personal capacity.51 The argument can extend beyond this. In Re
City Branch Group Ltd,52 conduct that was inimical to the interests of
the company’s subsidiary was held to be capable of being actually or
potentially prejudicial to the interests of the company’s shareholders
because of the risk of a diminution in value of the company’s invest-
ment in the subsidiary.53 However, not all transgressions by a com-
pany’s directors are of assistance to the petitioner. The English courts
draw a line at mere technical breaches of duty that do not cause
prejudice or loss to the company. Such breaches of duty do not, by
virtue of that fact, cause any corresponding prejudice to the member,
and are therefore incapable of sustaining a petition under the English
provision.54
However, the fact that prejudice was suffered does not necessarily
mean that it was suffered unfairly. Whether any particular instance of
prejudice is unfair so as to justify remedy is a separate consideration.
It is here that the contextual inquiry necessitated by the concept of
unfairness begins. In the Scottish decision of McGuinness v Bremner
plc55 referred to earlier, Lord Davidson considered that unfairness in
the circumstances must be judged by reference to the reasons given
by the directors for fixing the date of the general meeting as they did.
On the facts, his Lordship concluded that the reasons advanced were
unsound, and the petitioners were accordingly entitled to relief under
s. 459 of the Companies Act 1985. The case of Jesner v Jarrad Proper-
ties Ltd,56 also a Scottish decision, provides a contrasting example of a
case involving prejudice that was found not to be unfair. The peti-
tioner was a minority shareholder in two companies, Jarrad and
49 Ibid. at 679.
50 See also Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd (31 July 1981, unreported), referred to in Re
R A Noble, above n. 46 at 290–291.
51 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) at 54 (Lord Hutton), at 66 (Lord
Millett).
52 [2004] EWCA Civ 815, [2005] 1 WLR 3505.
53 Ibid. at [19].
54 Re Baumler (UK) Ltd [2004] EWHC 7673 (Ch), [2005] 1 BCLC 92 at [180].
55 Above n. 48.
56 Above n. 27.
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Jesner, all the shareholders of which were members of the same fam-
ily. The petitioner sought, inter alia, a buy-out order for his shares in
Jarrad. The acts complained of included certain interest-free loans
that were extended by Jarrad to Jesner, and security over property
belonging to Jarrad which was granted to a bank to secure Jesner’s
overdraft. The articles of association of Jarrad required a special reso-
lution before it may charge its assets as security, and although a
special resolution, purporting to have been passed by Jarrad at an
extraordinary general meeting, was produced, the trial judge found
that no such meeting of shareholders had ever taken place. It is fairly
obvious, and indeed the judge recognized as much, that these acts,
when looked at in isolation, would be prejudicial to the interests of
the shareholders of Jarrad, including the petitioner. However, the
evidence showed that the two companies had been run as a single
business, by common directors, and for the benefit of the family mem-
bers. The companies were, from inception, run informally ‘with a
total disregard for company law and the contents of the memorandum
and articles of association’.57 Shareholder meetings were not held,
and accounts were not issued. Inter-company loans were made as and
when the ‘exigencies of business demanded’.58 The petitioner, who
had full knowledge of this state of affairs, and who was, at one point,
also a director of Jarrad, had not hitherto raised any objection. In the
circumstances, taking into consideration the entire history of trans-
actions between the companies, the court concluded that there was no
unfairness to the petitioner.
Albeit rarer, it is also possible for the impugned acts to be unfair
without in fact causing any prejudice. The case of Rock Nominees Ltd
v RCO (Holdings) plc (in liquidation)59 illustrates this situation. The
subject company was the target of a takeover bid by ISS. However,
ISS’s plans to acquire 100 per cent of the company and to de-list the
company from the Stock Exchange was thwarted by the petitioner,
who refused to sell his 2.48 per cent stake despite the significant
premium on the share price offered by ISS. Ultimately, ISS, who had
by then acquired more than 90 per cent of the shares in the company,
decided that the operating subsidiary of the company should be sold
to ISS(UK), a company within the ISS group. The sale was approved
by the company’s directors, who were also directors of ISS(UK). It
may be readily appreciated that the sale was not entirely fair to the
minority shareholder, who was thereby deprived of any right to par-
ticipate in the financial benefits that may accrue to the company via
the subsidiary. However, as the evidence showed that the price paid
by ISS(UK) for the shares in the operating subsidiary was the ‘best
57 Ibid. at 1035.
58 Ibid.
59 [2004] EWCA Civ 118, [2004] 1 BCLC 439. 
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price reasonably obtainable’60 in the circumstances, no harm or preju-
dice had been caused to the petitioner.61
Interestingly, despite the judicial statements which suggest that
prejudice is really only a facet of the unfairness that is required under
s. 216,62 the position in Singapore may not, in the final analysis, be all
that different. An analysis of the Court of Appeal’s actual treatment of
the allegations in Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings Ltd63 discloses
not only an appreciation of the conceptual difference between preju-
dice on the one hand, and unfairness on the other, but also strongly
suggests at least tacit acknowledgement that unfairness without
prejudice may not sustain a s. 216 petition.
O&O, the petitioner, held 30 per cent of the shares in Richvein,
whilst U Ltd, controlled essentially by HN, held the majority 70 per
cent. Richvein had been incorporated pursuant to a joint venture,
originally between O&O and U Ltd, to develop and operate a hotel in
Singapore, and HN was appointed to the board of Richvein as a
nominee of U Ltd. On the basis of the brevity and informality of the
negotiations between the parties, the Court of Appeal64 considered
that Richvein had essentially begun its existence as a quasi-
partnership.65 Unfortunately, the relationship between the parties de-
clined, culminating in a s. 216 petition by O&O. O&O relied on three
matters to support its allegation of oppression: first, the transfer by U
Ltd of its 70 per cent stake in Richvein to Bonvests Holdings Ltd, a
listed company controlled by the family of HN; secondly, a hastily
completed rights issue; and finally, the entry into a number of con-
tracts by Richvein with service providers which were companies re-
lated to Bonvests.
Vis-à-vis the share transfer to Bonvests, HN contended that this
was essentially an ‘internal group restructuring’66 which was not in-
tended to affect the relationship between the parties. However, as the
share transfer was to a listed company, and one that was controlled by
HN, this meant that HN could readily monetize his investment in
Richvein. O&O, on the other hand, was effectively ‘locked in a new
business relationship with a listed public company that bears no re-
semblance to the implicit understanding’67 between the parties as
originally envisaged. The move was therefore clearly prejudicial to
O&O. The High Court had concluded, on the premise that O&O had
consented to the transfer after negotiating for the removal of the pre-
emption rights contained in the company’s articles of association, that
60 Ibid. at [76].
61 [2004] EWCA Civ 118, [2004] 1 BCLC 439 at [79].
62 Above n. 19 at [76], [118].
63 Over & Over, above n. 16.
64 The High Court did not conclude on the issue, as it was of the view that it would
be unnecessary to do so: Over & Over, above n. 19 at [78].
65 Over & Over, above n. 16 at [86]ff.
66 Above n. 19 at [18].
67 Over & Over, above n. 16 at [103].
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the prejudice was not unfair. The Court of Appeal, however, reached
the diametrically opposite conclusion that the prejudice was unfair68
by including the manner in which that consent was obtained into the
equation.69 As VK Rajah JA pointed out, O&O had been presented
with ‘Hobson’s choice’,70 and the fact that O&O made a choice should
not be taken as indicating that it was a willing participant, or that it
could not ‘keep its powder keg dry’.71
The rights issue was purportedly necessary to raise funds to repay
a bank loan which Richvein had earlier obtained from DBS. There was
evidence that Bonvests and HN had made it difficult for O&O, a Hong
Kong company, to subscribe for the rights shares by requiring pay-
ment within a very tight timeframe. There was also evidence that the
rights issue was not commercially justified and had in fact been called
with the view to dilute O&O’s shareholding in Richvein. In the circum-
stances, the Court of Appeal concluded that not only was prejudice
suffered by O&O (in the form of the ‘considerable inconvenience’72 it
had been put through), but also that the prejudice had been unfair, as
its real objective was to dilute O&O’s shareholding.
Vis-à-vis the related party contracts, the articles of association of
Richvein prohibited any of its directors from voting in respect of any
contract in which he had an interest.73 However, despite his interest in
the contracts, HN caused Richvein to enter into the contracts without
reference to the Richvein board, effectively depriving O&O of the
opportunity, through its nominee on the board, to consider and dis-
approve of the same. In the context of a quasi-partnership, this ‘con-
scious bypassing’74 of the articles is unfair. However, there was no
harm suffered by the shareholders as, on the evidence, Richvein’s
entry into these contracts may in fact have benefited the joint venture
partners.75 O&O had therefore suffered no prejudice. In the circum-
stances, the Court of Appeal recognized that, on its own, this particu-
lar aspect of O&O’s complaint would not be sufficient to sustain a
claim of oppression.
The Court of Appeal was clearly appreciative of the different con-
siderations that underpin the related albeit separate concepts of
prejudice and unfairness. Indeed, it is suggested, with respect, that
some measure of prejudice suffered by the member is in fact in-
herently required by the statutory language employed in s. 216. Whilst
any attempt to closely define the four concepts adopted in s. 216 is, as
alluded to earlier, rightly eschewed, an understanding of what each
68 Ibid. at [105].
69 Ibid. at [102].
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. at [103].
72 Ibid. at [127].
73 Ibid. at [33].
74 Ibid. at [98].
75 Ibid.
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entails does provide useful clues as to the correct direction our in-
quiries should take. The term ‘oppression’ has been said to refer to a
concept that is narrower than ‘unfair prejudice’.76 Oppression is said
to occur when dominant shareholders conduct the company’s affairs
in a manner that is ‘“burdensome, harsh and wrongful” to the other
members of the company or some of them, and lacks that degree of
probity which they are entitled to expect in the conduct of the com-
pany’s affairs’.77 The fact that the impugned conduct is ‘burdensome,
harsh and wrongful’ to the other members of the company is sug-
gestive of the presence of prejudice. The second ground, that of dis-
regard of a member’s interest, was considered by the Privy Council in
Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd.78 Lord Wilberforce, delivering
the judgment of the Board, stated as follows:
‘[D]isregard’ involves something more than a failure to take account of
the minority’s interest: there must be awareness of that interest and an
evident decision to override it or brush it aside or to set at naught the
proper company procedure.79
This manner of disregard is also indicative of prejudice. The expres-
sion ‘unfair discrimination’ conveys the idea of a bias or differenti-
ation that is not positive in impact for those who are subject to the
bias or differentiation. And this is quintessentially ‘prejudice’. The
fourth and final ground, that of prejudice, speaks for itself. Indeed, the
juxtaposition of the word ‘other’ with the word ‘prejudice’ suggests
that it is prejudice that is common to the other grounds and that it
is prejudice to the member’s interests that is prompting the petitioner
to complain. In the absence of prejudice thus, there can be no
complaint.
Interpreting s. 216 so as to demand the presence of prejudice, as
Rubin J did, may also be supported beyond purely textual grounds.
The commitments parties make contractually are generally considered
from an economic perspective to be ‘high cost’ items as parties put
considerable effort into crafting the contract terms which govern the
relationship between them.80 The company’s constitution is one such
‘high cost contract’, which, in a closely-held company, is likely to have
resulted from actual bargaining between the parties. If a court re-
solves disputes in deference to terms which have been explicitly
agreed to by the parties, this is consistent with efficiency considera-
tions for at least two reasons. First, as the outcome of any dispute
between the parties is determined by the contract and hence predict-
able, the costs of resolution of the dispute are thereby reduced. And
76 See Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee 1962, Cm 1749 (the
Jenkins Report) para. 212(c).
77 Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1042 (CA) at 1059 (emphasis
added). See also Low Peng Boon v Low Janie [1999] 1 SLR 761 (CA) at [42].
78 Above n. 23.
79 Ibid. at 229 (emphasis added).
80 Cheffins, above n. 6 at 274–5.
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second, the potential reduction in costs should encourage parties to
pay closer ex ante attention to the terms of their agreement so as to
result in a virtuous circle of efficient utilization of resources.81 Yet it is
trite that relief may be granted under s. 216 even if the majority
shareholders have acted within their strict legal rights and in ac-
cordance with the statutory contract.82 This intervention is often justi-
fied on the ground that the actual ‘contract’ is imperfect as a result of
bargaining deficiencies that must be present in reality, with gaps
which s. 216 is intended to plug.83 How should this ‘gap’ be plugged in
an efficient manner? It is submitted that this is where ‘prejudice’
comes in. Unfairness per se is simply too nefarious a concept to justify
any bypassing of the actual bargain between the parties. Relying only
on unfairness would result in the law being overly protective of the
minority, which might have the undesirable effect of deterring invest-
ments in ventures with minority holdings. Requiring that the peti-
tioner suffer some form of loss or harm before relief may be available
to him offers a balanced approach that takes account of both the
majority and minority perspectives. This, it is submitted, better ap-
proximates the parties’ bargain, even one that is hypothetically deter-
mined, and provides a reasonable basis for judicial intervention.
IV. Qua Member Interests Requirement?
One factor which is thought to have contributed to the ‘emascula-
tion’84 of s. 210 of the UK Companies Act 1948 was the judicial reading
81 See generally, C.A. Riley, ‘Contracting Out of Company Law: Section 459 of the
Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Court’ [1992] 55 MLR 782; Cheffins,
above n. 6 at ch. 6.
82 Relief has been granted, for example, where a shareholder was removed as
director even though this was within the majority’s legal rights: see Tulio v Maoro
[1994] 2 SLR 489 (CA); Kitnasamy v Nagatheran [2000] 2 SLR 598 (CA). See also
cases involving share issues: Over & Over, above n. 16; Re Cumana Ltd [1986]
BCLC 430 (CA); and cases involving the declaration of dividends: Re Gee Hoe
Chan Trading Co Pte Ltd (1991) 2 SLR(R) 114 (HC); Re a Company, ex p Glossop
[1988] 1 WLR 1068 (HC). See also above n. 26.
83 Economists explain that in the real world, parties are unlikely, whether by reason
of information asymmetry, transaction costs or other bargaining-related
limitations, to contract in a manner which ensures the most efficient allocation of
resources. Indeed, to attempt to do so would escalate costs of transaction
astronomically. As such, legal rules are necessary to ‘fill the gaps’. Much of
company law rules may therefore be evaluated on this ‘gap-filling’ basis—giving
rise to the ‘hypothetical bargaining model’. This model or framework requires
consideration of what rational parties, be they shareholders, creditors or other
corporate players, would contract for in ideal conditions, i.e. the hypothetical
bargain. The statutory oppression remedy may be analysed as one such ‘standard
contract term’ supplied by companies legislation. The views on this are, however,
not homogenous. See Riley, above n. 81, for a consideration of the issue. See also
C.A.E. Goodhart, ‘Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic?’ (1997) 60
MLR 1.
84 L. Sealy, ‘Problems of Standing, Pleading and Proof in Corporate Litigation’ in
B.G. Pettet (ed.), Company Law in Change, Current Legal Problems (Stevens:
London, 1987) 15.
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into the section of a requirement that any oppression or prejudice
suffered by the petitioner must be suffered qua member and not in
any other capacity. A member’s exclusion from management or expul-
sion from the board, for example, would technically not satisfy the
requirement. Such a complaint, as was held in Re Lundie Brothers,85
would have ‘nothing to do with [the petitioner’s] status as a share-
holder in the company at all’, as it related not to the petitioner’s status
as a shareholder, but to his status as a director, of the company. Such
a rigid conceptualization of the requirement would undoubtedly con-
strain the operation of the remedy, especially since complaints of
oppression often include a shareholder’s removal from the office of
director.86
Although s. 216 does not overtly so state, the manner in which the
section is couched does suggest that it is meant to protect the petition-
ing member87 because of his status as a member. Thus, the section
provides that the conduct complained of must be ‘oppressive to one
or more of the members . . . or in disregard of his or their interests as
members . . . or unfairly discriminates against or is otherwise preju-
dicial to one or more of the members’.88 This textual interpretation is
in fact consistent with the rationale for the introduction of the remedy
as seen from the perspective of economists. Despite their dominant
position in the company, shareholders’ interests are often difficult to
protect by purely contractual means.89 This difficulty may be attrib-
uted to the fact that, unlike other corporate players, their interests are
defined by a long-term relation with the company and with each other
which is, as a general proposition, not subject to periodic review.90
The long-term nature of the relation means that it is difficult for the
parties not only to foresee or appreciate all future contingencies so as
to expressly provide for them,91 but also to anticipate changes in
circumstances that might render the application of the agreed terms
out of sync with their original intentions. Legal provisions that protect
shareholders’ interests are therefore necessary to fill this perceived
contractual gap,92 and the oppression remedy, as such a gap-filler,
should be interpreted so as to achieve this purpose. The outside inter-
ests of a shareholder, on the other hand, stand on a different footing.
These interests are either already protected by other legal rules (such
85 [1965] 1 WLR 1051 (Ch).
86 See e.g. Tullio v Maoro [1994] 2 SLR(R) 501 (CA); Kitnasamy v Nagatheran [2000] 1
SLR(R) 542 (CA); Lim Swee Khiang, above n. 11.
87 It should be noted that s. 216 may be availed not only by members, but also by
holders of debenture stock issued by the company. The comments here are,
however, confined to applications by members.
88 Emphasis added.
89 Kraakman, above n. 5 at 15.
90 O. Williamson, ‘Corporate Governance’ (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1197, 1210.
91 See Riley, above n. 81 at 786.
92 See above n. 83. See also Cheffins, above n. 80 at 466.
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as is the case with creditors) or are arguably better protected con-
tractually (as is the case with employees).93 Accordingly, it is the peti-
tioner’s interests as a member that s. 216 aims to protect.94 This has
been judicially affirmed. In Tan Choon Yong v Goh Jon Keat,95 Tan Lee
Meng J stated that for the purpose of relief ordered under s. 216, the
allegedly unfair conduct ‘must affect a member in his capacity as
member’.96
This interpretation of s. 216 is consistent with that which currently
prevails in the UK. Despite the legislative changes made to the oppres-
sion remedy there, the qua member requirement was not removed
nor overtly re-defined by the unfair prejudice provision that replaced
s. 210. In fact, the continued applicability of the requirement in the UK
to the present unfair preference provision has been repeatedly af-
firmed by the English courts. Auld LJ’s observation in Re Phoenix
Office Supplies Ltd, Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd v Larvin97 is repre-
sentative of the general sentiment:
[The English provision is] designed for the protection of the members of
companies. It is in that capacity that they seek its protection, not as
directors or employees . . .98
This notwithstanding, it is clear that, in the UK, the qua member
requirement is no longer construed as narrowly as it was before.
Specifically, it is accepted that members’ interests, for the purposes of
the unfair prejudice remedy, may extend beyond the strict legal rights
as defined by the companies legislation and the company’s constitu-
tion. The reason for this, as Lord Wilberforce explained in Ebrahimi v
Westbourne Galleries,99 is that:
[A] limited company is more than a mere legal entity, with a personality
in law of its own: . . . there is room in company law for recognition of the
fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights,
93 Cheffins, above n. 6 at 62–3; 470.
94 See also Re A Company (No 00477 of 1986) [1986] BCLC 376 (Ch) at 379.
95 [2009] 3 SLR(R) 840 (HC) (Tan Choon Yong).
96 Ibid. at [34] (emphasis added). See also C.H. Tan (gen. ed.), Walter Woon on
Company Law, rev 3rd edn (Sweet & Maxwell: Singapore, 2009) [5.60].
97 [2002] EWCA Civ 1740, [2003] 1 BCLC 76.
98 [2003] 1 BCLC 76 at [27]. See also Re A Company (No 004475 of 1982) [1983] Ch
178 where Lord Grantchester QC explained what this means in the following
terms (at 189):
. . . Parliament did not intend to give a right of action to every shareholder who
considered that some act or omission by his company resulted in unfair
prejudice to himself. In argument, an example was advanced of a shareholder
who objected to his company carrying out some operation on land adjoining
his dwelling house, which resulted in that house falling in value. It is not
difficult to envisage an act or omission on the part of a company rendering an
asset of a shareholder, other than his shares, of lesser value. In my judgment
[the unfair prejudice provision] is to be construed as confined to ‘unfair
prejudice’ of a petitioner ‘qua member’; or, put in another way, the word
‘interests’ in [the provision] is confined to ‘interests of the petitioner as a
member’.
99 [1973] AC 360 (HL). This well-known case was a decision on the rights of a
member to obtain a winding-up order on just and equitable grounds.
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expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily sub-
merged in the company structure.
Recognizing this has allowed the English court to widen the scope of
a member’s protectable interests to cover certain expectations that
may have arisen out of some understanding or informal agreement
between the shareholders. Thus, a shareholder may be given to un-
derstand that he will be able to participate in management. That this
expectation may, in certain circumstances, translate into a qua mem-
ber right was accepted by Hoffmann J (as Lord Hoffmann then was) in
Re A Company (No 00477 of 1986).100 His Lordship explained the posi-
tion as follows:
[I]n the case of the managing director of a large public company who is
also the owner of a small holding in the company’s shares, it is easy to
see the distinction between his interests as a managing director em-
ployed under a service contract and his interests as a member. In the
case of a small private company in which two or three members have
invested their capital by subscribing for shares on the footing that
dividends are unlikely but that each will earn his living by working for
the company as a director, the distinction may be more elusive. The
member’s interests as a member who has ventured his capital in the
company’s business may include a legitimate expectation that he will
continue to be employed as a director and his dismissal from that office
and exclusion from the management of the company may therefore be
unfairly prejudicial to his interests as a member.101
This limited extension of the qua member requirement is arguably
also consistent with the idea of the oppression remedy fulfilling a gap-
filling role, as effect is given to the expectations and understandings
between shareholders that undergird their association, but which, for
reasons associated with the limitations of bargaining, are not included
or reflected in the express contracts between them.102
Although it was Lord Hoffmann who first used the phrase ‘legit-
imate expectations’ to demarcate the constraints placed by the statut-
ory remedy on the exercise of majority power,103 his Lordship has
since deprecated the use of the phrase.104 The preferred locution is
now ‘equitable considerations’.105 Nevertheless, as a concept, there
has been no change and the same considerations continue to move
the court in unfair prejudice cases. Therefore, as long as ‘legitimate
expectations’ is used in the sense intended by Lord Hoffmann, it is a
pithy phrase that quickly conveys the idea behind the concept. Indeed,
100 [1986] BCLC 376 (Ch).
101 Ibid. at 379.
102 See above n. 83.
103 See also Re Saul D Harrison & Sons, above n. 26 at 19.
104 In O’Neill v Phillips, his Lordship thought that it ‘was probably a mistake to use
this term’: above n. 21 at 1102.
105 McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch), [2012] All
ER (D) 71 at [635].
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that could be why the phrase has continued to be used by the courts
in Singapore.106 It is, however, important to be clear as to the bound-
aries of the concept and not be distracted by the potential width
suggested by the ordinary meaning of the phrase. It is not every
expectation that a minority shareholder harbours that is a legitimate
expectation, giving rise to equitable considerations. Expectations that
are merely factual, and there would be many instances of this, cannot
extend a member’s protectable interests under the section. In O’Neill v
Phillips,107 Lord Hoffmann made it clear that the legitimate expecta-
tion is a ‘correlative right’108 which places an equitable restraint on the
majority’s legal powers. This means that, when such a right exists, any
exercise of majority power, even if in compliance with the constitution
and the law, and therefore technically proper, may nevertheless be
potentially unfair if it denies this shareholder’s right. The correlative
right exists only because the nature of the relationship between mem-
bers is such that equity considers it unfair for the majority to exercise
the legal rights which are conferred upon it by the constitution of the
company. As the legitimate expectation is ‘a consequence, not a cause,
of the equitable restraint’,109 the first matter that must be established,
therefore, is that the relationship between the members is one to
which such equitable considerations may apply so as to give force to
any understanding between the parties that is extraneous to the com-
pany’s constitution.110 In many companies, shareholders associate on
the basis of a formal structure that is defined by the applicable legisla-
tion, the corporate constitution and any formal shareholders’ agree-
ment between them. There is usually no room in such companies for
‘supra-structural’ expectations.111 However, in some companies, com-
panies which, as Lord Wilberforce put it, are ‘more than’ mere legal
entities, the relationship between the shareholders may not be ex-
haustively defined by the formal structure. What manner of relation-
ships are these then?
Lord Hoffmann provided at least two signposts. First, his Lordship
made reference to the fact that company law had developed seam-
lessly from the law of partnership, which imposes a duty of utmost
good faith112 on every partner that is due to every other partner. This
fact provides the background and context to the unfair prejudice
106 See e.g. Over & Over, above n. 16 at [78]; Lim Chee Twang v Chan Shuk Kuen
Helina [2010] 2 SLR 209 (HC) at [78] and [79].
107 Above n. 21.
108 Ibid. at 1102.
109 Ibid.
110 See also Sim Yong Kim v Evenstar Investments Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 827 (CA) at
[40]ff and Eng Gee Seng v Quek Choon Teck [2010] 1 SLR 241 (HC) at [6]ff.
111 Ebrahimi, above n. 25 at 379.
112 Blisset v Daniel (1853) 10 Hare 493.
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remedy. Second, Lord Hoffmann agreed with Jonathan Parker J (as he
then was) who had said in Re Astec (BSR) plc113 that:
. . . in order to give rise to an equitable constraint based on ‘legitimate
expectation’ what is required is a personal relationship or personal deal-
ings of some kind between the party seeking to exercise the legal right
and the party seeking to restrain such exercise, such as will affect the
conscience of the former.114
Such relationships have been described as ‘quasi-partnerships’. Al-
though it is often easier to establish that the company is a quasi-
partnership where it was in fact converted from a pre-existing
partnership,115 or where its members are all members of a family,116
this does not mean that there cannot be a quasi-partnership between
‘savvy, experienced investors’ as Over & Over Ltd v Bonvests Holdings
Ltd117 amply demonstrates.
Returning then to Tan J’s statement118 in Tan Choon Yong v Goh Jon
Keat,119 the question is what this qua member requirement entails for
s. 216. Clearly his Honour’s statement should not be read literally, as
this could potentially mean a return to the narrow interpretation that
plagued the remedy during the era of s. 210. Indeed, as the reasoning
and analysis applied by the English courts, especially in the cases of
Ebrahimi and O’Neill, have been accepted locally,120 s. 216 must there-
fore also embrace the broadening of the qua member rights by refer-
ence to the concept of legitimate expectations. This notwithstanding,
Lord Hoffmann’s exhortation not to allow the concept of a legitimate
expectation to ‘lead a life of its own’ ought to be kept firmly in mind. It
should be reiterated that it is the existence of such a personal relation-
ship that allows the concept of qua member interests in the unfair
prejudice remedy to be extended, if at all, to embrace legitimate ex-
pectations which fall technically outside of its remit. As Chan Seng
Onn J recognized in Eng Gee Seng v Quek Choon Teck,121 except for
113 [1998] 2 BCLC 556 (Ch).
114 Ibid. at 588 (emphasis added). See also Ebrahimi, above n. 25 where Lord
Wilberforce referred (at 379) to equitable considerations ‘of a personal character
arising between one individual and another, which may make it unjust, or
inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in a particular way’. Lord
Wilberforce’s explication of the principles on which the court exercises its
jurisdiction to order a winding up on the just and equitable ground was
considered by Lord Hoffmann to be equally applicable to the unfair prejudice
remedy.
115 Ebrahimi, above n. 25 at 379.
116 See e.g. Low Peng Boon, above n. 77; Lim Swee Khiang, above n. 11; Sim Yong
Kim v Evenstar Investments Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR(R) 827 (CA); cf. Loh Kwok Kee v
Foo Hee Toon Gilbert [2011] SGHC 116 at [29].
117 [2010] 2 SLR 776 (CA) at [85].
118 See above n. 96.
119 Above n. 95.
120 See e.g. Sim Yong Kim, above n. 110; Lim Swee Khiang, above n. 11; Over & Over,
above n. 19; Eng Gee Seng v Quek Choon Teck, above n. 110.
121 [2010] 1 SLR 241 (HC) at [17].
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cases involving quasi-partnerships founded on mutual trust and con-
fidence, it should not ‘ordinarily be easy to establish the existence’ of
such legitimate expectations as the court should be mindful of rewrit-
ing the terms that underpin the formation of any company. In the light
of this, it is suggested with respect that the actual decision of Tan
Choon Yong v Goh Jon Keat122 may not be readily reconcilable with
established principles.
The plaintiff Tan was a minority shareholder in the company ARG.
Tan had been persuaded by the defendants, who controlled a majority
of the votes in the company, to leave his employ with a diagnostic
testing company to be the chief executive officer of ARG. The dir-
ectors of the company were initially Tan and his wife, and the defend-
ants. The company applied for and obtained listing on Phillips
Securities’ Over-the-Counter Capital to raise funds for the company’s
business. The fact that Tan was to helm the operations of ARG was
capitalized upon for the purposes of the listing application. Shortly
thereafter, the defendants, using their majority shareholding, caused
Tan to be removed from the position of chief executive officer, and
ensured that neither he nor his wife were reappointed as directors to
the board. The facts suggest a possible plan by the defendants to
misuse the investor funds raised to pay themselves excessive salaries,
and the court found that the defendants were in breach of their duties
to the company where their employment contracts and their entitle-
ment to these salaries thereunder were concerned.
Whilst an abuse of power by the directors who represent the com-
pany’s majority shareholders may amount to oppression,123 it is ob-
vious that this was not the main plank of Tan’s case. Instead, it was
Tan’s removal as the company’s chief executive officer contrary to the
‘legitimate expectation and understanding that he would have an im-
portant role in the management of the company’124 that was the focus
of the petitioner’s case and which formed the primary basis of the
court’s decision.125 The court found that there was indeed such an
understanding between the parties, and consequently, the attempts by
the defendants to renege on the understanding amounted to oppress-
ive conduct which entitled Tan to relief under s. 216. Undoubtedly, Tan
was possessed of a factual expectation of having significant manage-
rial involvement. It is, however, less obvious that this expectation was
legitimate in the sense that Lord Hoffmann intended. It is not appar-
ent that ARG was a quasi-partnership or that there was anything
especially personal in the relationship between Tan and the majority
shareholders. Indeed, the formality of the relationship is reinforced by
122 Above n. 95.
123 Over & Over, above n. 16 at [122].
124 Tan Choon Yong, above n. 95 at [40].
125 See Tan Choon Yong, above n. 95 at [46], [105] and [111].
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the fact that Tan had an employment contract with the company on
the basis of which he had pursued a separate action for wrongful
dismissal.126 In arriving at the conclusion that Tan’s expectation was
legitimate, the court placed considerable emphasis on Tan’s profes-
sional qualifications and capabilities, and that these were major fac-
tors in securing the company’s listing. However, these matters, with
respect, say little about the peculiar relationship between the share-
holders, an understanding of which, as we know from O’Neill v
Phillips, is of fundamental importance before any conclusion can be
made as to the existence of that ‘second tier of rights and obliga-
tions’127 that are known as legitimate expectations.128 In such circum-
stances, it is arguable that the interests that Tan sought to protect
were in fact not qua member rights. Tan should not, with respect,
have therefore succeeded in his application.129
In conclusion, therefore, although the oppression remedy is indeed
couched in the most generous terms in order to confer on the courts a
wide discretion to do what is just and fair, it is nevertheless subject to
clear, albeit limited, constraints. One of these constraints is the im-
position of the qua member requirement. This will, where a member
seeks to call the section into operation, limit the class of protectable
interests under s. 216. Although our courts will not adopt too techni-
cal a construction of the requirement, and are clearly prepared to
extend the nature of interests so as to embrace even those which are
not traditionally considered qua member interests, it is nevertheless
important that any extension is allowed only after due consideration
of the minority’s legitimate expectations, which are themselves born
of the understanding that predicates the members’ association. And
so long as these interests are, in Walker J’s words, ‘an absolutely
essential part’130 of the arrangements between the parties, they would
undoubtedly fall to be protected under s. 216. Such an approach
would certainly be consistent with the welfare-maximizing and
126 Tan Choon Yong, above n. 95 at [7].
127 See Re J E Cade & Son Ltd [1992] BCLC 213 (Ch) at 227.
128 See also Eng Gee Seng, above n. 120 at [17], where Chan Seng Onn J observed
that, except for cases involving quasi-partnerships founded on mutual trust and
confidence, it should not ‘ordinarily be easy to establish the existence’ of such
legitimate expectations as the court should be mindful of rewriting the terms
that underpin the formation of any company. See also Ng Sing King, above n. 19
at [95].
129 In some respects, the Privy Council decision in Gamlestaden Fastigheter AV v
Baltic Partners Ltd [2007] UKPC 26, [2008] 1 BCLC 468 presents similar difficulties.
As the subject company was not likely, on the evidence, to be a quasi-partnership,
it is questionable whether the court should have recognized that the shareholder’s
rights should have been extended beyond its strict qua member rights to include
its rights qua creditor. See further T. Singla, ‘Unfair Prejudice in the Privy Council’
(2007) 123 LQR 542; R. Goddard, ‘The Unfair Prejudice Remedy’ (2008) 12 Edin
LR 93.
130 R & H Electric Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 280 (Ch) at 295.
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efficiency-driven agenda that is promoted by the hypothetical bar-
gaining model.
V. Corporate Wrongs and Personal Rights
One of the issues raised in Gamlestaden Fastigheter AV v Baltic Part-
ners Ltd131 was whether an order could be made, under the unfair
prejudice provision, for substantial relief to be awarded not to the
petitioning shareholder, but to the company whose affairs have al-
legedly been conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner. There are
several strands to the issue. There is, first, the logically preceding
question, which asks whether the unfair prejudice provision, and its
oppression equivalents, ought to apply at all when the matters com-
plained of effectively comprise wrongs to the company. Whilst not all
complaints of unfair prejudice, or of oppression, will involve wrongs
against the company, it is not uncommon to find a petition founded
upon facts which also disclose a concurrent wrong against the com-
pany, usually a breach of directors’ duties.132 As is well-known, the
rule in Foss v Harbottle133 dictates that, subject to a tightly constrained
exception, only the company itself may sue for a wrong done against
it. The exception, which determines when individual shareholders
may be permitted to sue derivatively on the company’s behalf, is
notoriously restricted in its application because of the majority rule.
The law, in general, respects the will of a majority of the company’s
shareholders. Hence, ‘[I]f a mere majority of the members of the com-
pany . . . is in favour of what has been done, then cadit quaestio. No
wrong has been done to the company . . . and there is nothing in
respect of which anyone can sue’.134 If left to the devices of the major-
ity therefore, there will certainly be some direct wrongs to the com-
pany, committed with the blessings of the majority, that will go
unremedied. It is in such circumstances that the unfair prejudice
remedy has had its greatest impact.
What then if the common law derivative action is in fact available?
The courts have generally refused to accept that this would afford any
bar to an unfair prejudice petition. In Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn
Bhd,135 the Privy Council considered s. 181 of the Companies Act 1965
of Malaysia, which is in pari materia with Singapore’s s. 216. Lord
131 Above n. 129.
132 See e.g. Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon Pte Ltd [1995] 2 SLR(R) 304 (CA); Lim
Swee Khiang, above n. 11; Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354 (Ch); Re
Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 420 (Ch); Clark v Cutland [2004] 1
WLR 783 (CA). See also H.-C. Hirt, ‘In What Circumstances Should Breaches of
Directors’ Duties Give Rise to a Remedy Under ss 459–61 of the Companies Act
1985?’ (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 100; S. Griffin, ‘Shareholder Remedies and the
No Reflective Loss Principle—Problems Surrounding the Identification of a
Membership Interest’ [2010] 6 JBL 461 at 470–1.
133 (1843) 2 Hare 461.
134 Famously per Jenkins LJ in Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) at 1066.
135 Above n. 23.
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Wilberforce, who delivered their Lordships’ advice, stated that ‘if a
case of “oppression” or “disregard” is made out, the section applies
and it is no answer to say that relief might also have been obtained in
a minority shareholders’ action’.136 This must be right, for many a
corporate wrong provides the very means by which oppression is
inflicted by the majority upon the complaining minority share-
holders. As Hoffmann LJ observed in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons
Plc,137 ‘[e]nabling the court in an appropriate case to outflank the rule
in Foss v Harbottle was one of the purposes of the section’.
To accept that the grounds upon which an oppression claim may be
made out can comprise essentially corporate wrongs is, it should be
pointed out, quite a different matter from saying that corporate claims
may be pursued via an oppression petition. There is, however, some
English authority, in respect of the pre-2006 UK unfair prejudice pro-
vision, which appears to be sympathetic towards this latter possibility.
In Clark v Cutland,138 an unfair prejudice petition was brought on the
premise of a director’s breach of his duties in misappropriating sig-
nificant sums from the company. Although the petitioner had initially
commenced a derivative action on the company’s behalf, this action
was ‘consolidated’ with the unfair prejudice proceedings he subse-
quently brought. The lower court had, upon a finding of unfair preju-
dice, ordered the acquisition of the respondent’s shares. This result
would not demand especial attention but for the judge’s view that
‘there was a wide jurisdiction under s. 461 to give relief against third
parties which could have been granted in a derivative action’139 and
further that ‘it was appropriate for him to treat the petition as if it
were a derivative action’.140 Arden LJ’s unqualified acknowledgement
of the trial judge’s views may be read as tacit acceptance that the
unfair prejudice provision may be utilized to vindicate essentially cor-
porate claims.141 Sending similar signals is the almost contemporan-
eous decision of Bhullar v Bhullar.142
136 Ibid. at 229. See also Re Stewarts (Brixton) Ltd [1985] BCLC 4 (Ch); Re A Company
(No 005287 of 1985) [1986] 1 WLR 281 (Ch).
137 Above n. 26 at 18.
138 Above n. 132.
139 Ibid. at [8].
140 Clark, above n. 132 at [35] (emphasis added).
141 See also Lowe v Fahey [1996] 1 BCLC 262 (Ch) at 268; Anderson v Hogg 2002 SC
190, [2002] BCC 923. But see Re Chime Corp Ltd [2004] 3 HKLRD 922 (HKCFA) at
[24] (per Bokhary PJ).
142 [2003] 2 BCLC 241 (CA). The court at first instance (HC, 25 March 2002) had
rejected many of the petitioning shareholders’ allegations of unfairly prejudicial
conduct but found eventually for the petitioners, primarily on the basis of the
respondents’ alleged breach of directors’ duties. John Behrens QC declined to
grant the primary relief, of an order for the sale to the petitioners of the
respondents’ shares, sought by the petitioners. Instead, the learned judge held
that the respondents were in breach of their directors’ duty to avoid a conflict of
interests, and declared that the properties acquired in breach be transferred to
the company at cost. Given the limited grounds upon which unfair prejudice was
found, it would be fair to say that the case stood more for the vindication of the
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This potentially expansive view of the boundaries for application of
the unfair prejudice provision was rejected by Lord Scott in the deci-
sion of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Re Chime Corp Ltd.143
His Lordship expressed the view that it would not be appropriate for
the court, on an unfair prejudice petition, to entertain what would, in
effect, be a corporate action to redress a corporate wrong against the
company by its directors.144 This, in Lord Scott’s words, is an attempt
to circumvent the rule in Foss v Harbottle145 and would be an abuse of
process. Any such wrong should be established in a derivative
action.
Lord Scott’s point, with respect, should apply with greater force in
Singapore. There are two justifications for this view. First, the legis-
lative context of s. 216 demands so. The oppression action has co-
existed with the statutory derivative action found in s. 216A of the
Companies Act since 1993.146 Many of the difficulties associated with
the derivative action at common law, which, some have argued, may
have provided impetus for the path adopted by the English courts,147
are therefore of far less consequence for the minority shareholder in a
Singapore company.148 Although the relationship between the two
sections is not explicitly addressed, their juxtaposition does provide a
fairly obvious indication that s. 216 should not be interpreted as an
alternative or additional route to ‘outflank’149 the statutory derivative
action—on the contrary, the distinction between personal oppression
proceedings and corporate derivative proceedings is to be judiciously
maintained. This view is buttressed by the fact that when the Com-
panies Act was amended to include s. 216A, the marginal note to
corporate wrong, than of a personal grievance. The appeal related only to the
relief granted in respect of the property, and the English Court of Appeal
considered only the directors’ duties point and did not address the propriety of
the relief ordered.
143 Above n. 141. Section 168A of the Companies Ordinance Cap 32, which is Hong
Kong’s unfair prejudice provision, is similar in material aspects to the UK
provision.
144 Ibid. at [61].
145 (1843) 2 Hare 461.
146 The UK introduced the statutory derivative action in 2006 (Companies Act 2006
(UK) Pt 11, ss 260ff), whilst Hong Kong introduced the procedure in 2004 (ss
168BA to 168BI were added to Hong Kong’s Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) by
the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance).
147 See generally B. Hannigan, ‘Drawing Boundaries between Derivative Claims and
Unfairly Prejudicial Petitions’ [2009] 6 JBL 606.
148 At least not for the shareholder in an unlisted company: s. 216A is limited in its
application to unlisted companies. It should be noted that the Steering Committee
for the Review of the Companies Act has recommended that s. 216A be amended
to extend the statutory derivative action in its application to Singapore-
incorporated companies that are listed for quotation or quoted on a securities
market, whether in Singapore or overseas: Ministry of Finance, Report of the
Steering Committee for the Review of the Companies Act (2011) recommendation
2.30.
149 Or, as Professor Kershaw put it, as a ‘functional equivalent’ of a derivative action:
D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context (Oxford University Press: Oxford; New
York, 2009) 636.
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s. 216, which then read ‘Remedies in cases of oppression or injustice’,
was amended to read ‘Personal remedies in cases of oppression or
injustice’.150 In addition, the specific inclusion of an order to ‘authorise
civil proceedings to be brought in the name of or on behalf of the
company by such person or persons and on such terms as the Court
may direct’ in s. 216(2)(c), as one of the remedial orders that the court
may make on an oppression petition, underscores the distinction.151
The second justification arises, interestingly, from an efficiency per-
spective. The statutory derivative action is often rationalized as a
mechanism for corporate governance. In providing the procedure for
shareholders to take on litigation decisions on the company’s behalf, it
allows for shareholder enforcement of directors’ duties. This, the
argument goes, mitigates not only the agency costs associated with
the monitoring of management, but also those associated with
majority-minority shareholder conflict of interests.152 However, allow-
ing derivative actions by shareholders does, paradoxically, give rise to
a different agency problem, one that arises between the company, as
principal, and the litigating shareholder, as agent. This problem arises
because the agent (i.e. the shareholder) may be tempted to use the
derivative action in an opportunistic, self-serving manner.153 To deal
with the agency costs associated with this problem, the statutory
derivative action has built-in safeguards that serve to ensure that any
litigation brought by a shareholder to pursue corporate claims is
guided by the legitimate interests of the company and not for vexa-
tious or other extraneous reasons. When so constrained, the use of
the derivative suit should ultimately result in a general increase in
corporate value.154 This of course benefits all the stakeholders in the
company and promotes their overall welfare. The oppression remedy
possesses no such safeguards. Further, the very basis for the pursuit
of the oppression remedy is diametrically opposed to that which sup-
ports the statutory derivative action. Considerations that move the
150 Companies (Amendment) Act 1993 (No. 22 of 1993), s. 21 (emphasis added). The
relevance of marginal notes as aids to the interpretation of legislation is dealt with
by the Interpretation Act (Cap 1). Section 9A provides for the consideration of ‘all
matters not forming part of the written law that are set out in the document
containing the text of the written law as printed by the Government Printer’,
which would include the marginal note, to ‘confirm that the meaning of the
provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking
into account its context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying
the written law’.
151 Cf. Jennifer Payne, ‘Sections 459–461 Companies Act 1985 in Flux: The Future of
Shareholder Protection’ (2005) 64 CLJ 647, 653.
152 This latter cost arises because of the risk of the majority exercising their power to
prevent litigation against errant management who have so acted to further the
majority’s interests at the minority’s expense. See n. 5; see also D.W. Puchniak,
H. Baum and M. Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia—A
Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge;
New York, 2012) 13–14, 27.
153 See above n. 5.
154 R. Kraakman, H. Park, S. Shavell, ‘When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder
Interests?’ (1994) 82 Georgetown LJ 1733, 1736.
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court are therefore necessarily fundamentally different for each case.
Whilst the statutory derivative action mandates a consideration of
whether the intended litigation would be ‘prima facie in the interests
of the company’,155 an oppression petition is to be assessed primarily
from the perspective of the minority shareholder. To allow corporate
claims to be pursued via the oppression remedy would effectively
denude the statutory derivative action of much of its intended effect.
For these reasons, careful attention would have to be paid to the
derivative-personal divide to ensure that s. 216 is not being used to
vindicate corporate claims. To maintain this divide as a matter of
practice, it would be necessary to subject the initial pleadings to care-
ful scrutiny. Where, however, should the line be drawn? The judgment
of Millett J (as Lord Millett then was) in Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No
2)156 may provide some assistance. The learned judge had considered
the overlap between the personal and corporate actions and opined
that the distinction does not lie in the particular acts or omissions
of which complaint is made, but in the nature of the complaint and
the remedy necessary to meet it. The question is what ‘the whole
gist’157 of the complaint was. The learned judge made the following
observations:158
It is a matter of perspective. The metaphor is not a supermarket trolley
but a hologram. If the whole gist of the complaint lies in the unlawful-
ness of the acts or omissions complained of, so that it may be adequately
redressed by the remedy provided by law for the wrong, the complaint is
one of misconduct simpliciter. There is no need to assume the burden of
alleging and proving that the acts or omissions complained of evidence
or constitute unfairly prejudicial management of the company’s affairs.
It is otherwise if the unlawfulness of the acts or omissions complained of
is not the whole gist of the complaint, so that it would not be adequately
redressed by the remedy provided by law for the wrong. In such a case
it is necessary to assume that burden, but it is no longer necessary to
establish that the acts or omissions in question were unlawful, and a
much wider remedy may be sought.
Thus, whether the ‘whole gist’ of the complaint is derivative or per-
sonal requires a concurrent consideration of the remedy sought: if the
complaint may be adequately addressed by an order for restitution to
the company or some other substantive corporate remedy, the peti-
tioner’s complaint should be classified as derivative. In such cases, the
155 Companies Act Cap 50 (Singapore) s. 216A(3)(c).
156 [1990] BCLC 760 (Ch). The case involved a petition under the English Insolvency
Act 1986, s. 27, presented by 11 of the creditors of the company alleging that the
company's affairs had been managed by the company’s administrator in a manner
which was unfairly prejudicial to the creditors of the company.
157 Re Charnley Davies Ltd, above n. 156 at 783.
158 Ibid. (emphasis added).
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s. 216A derivative action, and not the s. 216 action, would be appro-
priate. It may be helpful to illustrate the difference by reference to two
local decisions. In the first case, Low Peng Boon v Low Janie,159 the
petitioner JL was a minority shareholder and director in the subject
company. She alleged, inter alia, that the respondent, who was the de
facto controller of the company, had conducted the affairs of the
company in a manner that was oppressive towards her. The factual
allegations made to support her petition disclosed various breaches of
directors’ duties involving mainly the misuse of corporate funds. Al-
though these were clearly corporate wrongs, and therefore capable of
being the subject matter of a derivative action, the Court of Appeal
found that the unlawful acts constituted oppressive conduct vis-à-vis
the petitioner. This was, with respect, a correct treatment of the case,
as the petitioner’s primary complaint was that the respondent had
been dismissive of her legitimate concerns, making her continued
involvement in the company meaningless. To paraphrase Millett J,160
the petitioner relied on the respondent’s breaches of duty, not to
found her action as such, but as evidence of the manner in which the
company’s affairs had been conducted for his own benefit and in
disregard of her interests as a minority shareholder. She accordingly
wanted relief from oppression and sought to be bought out. She was
not seeking a remedy for breach of duty.
Contrast these facts with Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon Pte
Ltd.161 The petitioner, Kumagai, was a shareholder in a company, KZ,
which was incorporated in pursuance of a joint venture. The other
party to the venture was Zenecon, a company controlled by one Low,
which held 51 per cent of the shares in KZ. The board of directors of
KZ comprised four nominees appointed by Kumagai and three
Zenecon nominees, including Low, who was also made managing
director of KZ. Kumagai complained of a number of transactions that
Low had engineered vis-à-vis KZ and its subsidiary, and argued that
Low’s conduct in connection thereto was oppressive to Kumagai. It
sought, inter alia, orders requiring Low to make restitution to KZ for
the losses it had suffered as a result of the impugned transactions. The
petitioner prevailed at trial and Low was ordered to pay compensa-
tion to KZ. This is, of course, corporate relief. The Court of Appeal
agreed with the lower court that Low had acted in breach of his
directors’ duties to KZ and that this was conduct oppressive to
Kumagai as a shareholder of KZ.162 Taken in isolation, this conclusion,
in itself, may be unobjectionable for, as alluded to earlier, the presence
of corporate wrongs often is evidence of oppression. The difficulty,
159 Above n. 24.
160 Re Charnley Davies Ltd, above n. 156 at 783.
161 Above n. 132.
162 Ibid. at [57].
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however, lies with the fact that the petitioner Kumagai had the major-
ity on the board of the company.163 It was therefore in the position to
have pursued a corporate action via the normal route without resort
to s. 216. Indeed, the main thrust of the complaints was the breach of
the duties owed to the company KZ by Low, rather than oppression of
the minority shareholder Kumagai as such. Within this factual matrix,
therefore, there may not be oppression or unfairness in the sense
envisaged by s. 216, and the complaints would have been more appro-
priately dealt with as a derivative claim.
The final strand to the issue posed at the start of this section relates
to the jurisdiction of the court, in a petition under s. 216, to make an
order for corporate relief. This very question was raised but only
briefly considered by the Court of Appeal in the case just con-
sidered.164 Counsel had argued that the court had no jurisdiction
under s. 216 to make such an order. The Court of Appeal disagreed,
holding that, subject to the limitation that the order made must be
‘with a view to bringing to an end or remedying the matters com-
plained of’ as dictated by the section, the jurisdiction to make orders
under the section was ‘very wide’165 and that an order to make good
the loss suffered by the company was ‘in principle . . . within the
purview of s. 216’.166
That the court has jurisdiction to make an order for corporate relief
cannot be seriously doubted. This is amply justified by the oft-
emphasized width of the statutory language employed in s. 216. Sec-
tion 216(2) provides for a non-exhaustive list of potential orders that
the court may make, which list is expressly stated to be ‘without
prejudice’ to the court’s jurisdiction to ‘make such order as it thinks
fit’, provided, as the Court of Appeal noted in Kumagai,167 that the
order is made ‘with a view to bringing to an end or remedying the
matters complained of’. This leaves room for the court to make other
orders, including, undoubtedly, an order for corporate relief. The
issue, however, is not only whether the court has the necessary juris-
diction to make such orders. There is a necessary postliminary ques-
tion, and that is whether the court should, in any particular case,
exercise its jurisdiction in this manner. As Lord Scott pointed out in
Re Chime Corpn Ltd,168 ‘[t]he fact . . . that the terms of a statute create
or confer a jurisdiction in very wide terms does not necessarily mean
163 Kumagai, above n. 161 at [5]. The shareholders’ agreement between the parties in
fact provided for equal representation with no provision for a casting vote. The
company’s articles on the other hand did not appear to have accorded with the
agreement, and the board ultimately consisted of four Kumagai nominees against
Zenecon’s three.
164 Kumagai, above n. 161.
165 Ibid. at [71].
166 Ibid. at [77]. Ultimately, however, the court did not affirm the lower court’s order
as it considered that there was insufficient evidence to show that the loss
sustained by the company was the result of Low’s wrongful acts.
167 Ibid. at [71].
168 Above n. 141.
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that the courts have an unlimited jurisdiction to make any orders that
are within the wide statutory terms’.169 In any given case, it may not
be appropriate or proper, notwithstanding the court’s undoubted
possession of the jurisdiction in the strict sense to make orders for
corporate relief, for the court to make such orders. There are un-
doubtedly situations, albeit not so commonplace, where an order for
corporate relief is necessary to provide the petitioning shareholder
with the most appropriate remedy. For example, a petitioner, espe-
cially one who may have emotional ties with the company, may spurn
the more usual remedy of having his shares bought by the respondent
in favour of a reverse order that the respondent sell his shares in the
company to the petitioner.170 In such a case, a concurrent order that
the errant respondent should compensate the company for such
losses as he had caused the company to suffer will be necessary to
‘bring to an end or remedy the matters complained of’. Similarly,
where the petitioner is seeking to wind up the company, or where the
court considers that the company ought to be wound up,171 it may be
proper that the errant directors make restitution to the company first,
so that the realized assets of the company more accurately reflect its
worth.172 These examples, it is submitted, illustrate the true purpose
for which the jurisdiction to order corporate relief should be exer-
cised in an oppression petition, and that is to complete the main order
for personal relief. Such orders can therefore only be supportive, and
should not be the main act.
VI. Conclusion
The oppression remedy contained in s. 216 of the Companies Act
plays an important role in minority shareholder protection in Singa-
pore. This is evidenced by the significant increase in the number of
s. 216 petitions in recent years.173 As such, it is necessary that both the
169 Lord Scott drew a distinction, as did Bokhary PJ, who gave the only other
reasoned judgment, between these two senses in which the term ‘jurisdiction’
may be understood—the strict or theoretical sense, and the wider, practical sense
which embraces considerations of the propriety of exercising that jurisdiction in a
particular case: Chime Corp, above n. 168 at [39]–[41] and [9].
170 The English case of Clark v Cutland [2003] EWCA Civ 810, [2004] 1 WLR 783 at [1]
provides an illustration of precisely such a situation.
171 Which was what occurred in Low Peng Boon v Low Janie, above n. 24.
172 Even in these situations, Lord Scott would advocate a cautious approach. In Re
Chime Corpn Ltd (above n. 141), his Lordship thought that, as a general rule, the
court should not exercise its jurisdiction to make any order for corporate relief,
unless the order ‘corresponds to the order to which the company would have
been entitled had the allegations in question been successfully prosecuted in an
action by the company (or in a derivative action in the name of the company)’ (at
[62]). Further, Lord Scott was of the view that the court should not allow a prayer
in the petition, that compensation or restitution be made by the allegedly errant
director to the company, to stand unless ‘it is clear at the pleading stage that a
determination of the amount, if any of the director’s liability at law to the
company can conveniently be dealt with in the hearing of the petition’: ibid.
173 Puchniak et al., above n. 152 at 360.
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scope of its application and the court’s jurisdiction to make remedial
orders are sufficiently wide in order to most effectively protect the
minority in the diverse situations of oppression and unfair conduct
that may arise in the corporate context. Nevertheless, the company is
an amalgam of different interests, rights and expectations that have to
be kept in harmony, and it is important, in any attempt to protect the
minority, that the balance is not tilted too far in favour of the minority
so as to be counter-productive. Majority rule is and remains the norm,
and legitimate rule of the majority ought not, unless there are valid
grounds, be too readily equated with tyranny by the majority. In this
context, hence, any uncertainty as to the scope of the oppression
remedy or question as to its limits ought to be recognized and clari-
fied. In this regard, this paper contributes to the current state of
understanding by advancing the following propositions in respect
of s. 216:
(1) The provision is primarily aimed at providing a remedy for any
unfairness, assessed contextually, that may be suffered by a
shareholder as a result of the conduct of the company’s affairs.
Circumscribing this broad concept by reference to a commercial
yardstick, as may have been suggested by a number of judicial
statements, would be clearly undesirable and should be
avoided.
(2) The concepts of prejudice and unfairness are discrete require-
ments that have to be separately satisfied. Prejudice needs to be
unfair before it can be justiciable, and unfairness requires a
context (i.e. prejudice) with which to ground it. The presence of
the one without the other should not be enough to invoke
s. 216.
(3) The scope for the application of the section is constrained in-
herently by its purpose, which is to protect shareholders’ rights
and interests. Thus, although the class of protectable rights and
interests may be extended beyond the traditional, any such ex-
tension should be allowed only after due consideration of the
shareholder’s legitimate expectations, as defined and circum-
scribed by the parties’ underlying association.
(4) To reconcile the juxtaposition of ss 216 and 216A, it is important
that the personal-derivative divide be maintained. Section 216
was not intended as an alternative route for the vindication of
corporate wrongs, and all attempts to use it thus should be
checked.
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